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 Globalization of Innovation: The Personal Computing Industry 
 
I. Introduction1 
 August 2006 marked the 25th anniversary of the release of the original IBM PC, 
the product that defined the standards around which a vast new industry formed.  Unlike 
the vertically integrated mainframe industry, the PC industry consisted of a global 
network of independent suppliers of systems, components, peripherals and software 
(Grove, 1996; Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998).  The key factor shaping the industry’s 
structure was the design of the IBM PC as a modular, open system with standard 
interfaces.  This allowed many newcomers to enter the market by specializing in one 
industry segment and developing innovations that could be integrated into any IBM-
compatible system.  It also permitted producers of parts, components, and systems to 
achieve global economies of scale as most of the world except Apple adopted the IBM 
standard.  In time, desktop PCs were joined by portable laptop/notebook PCs and PC 
servers as the industry innovated on this common standard. 
 Today, the core personal computing industry includes not only traditional desktop 
and laptop PCs and PC servers, but also smart handheld devices such as ultramobile PCs, 
PDAs and smart phones.  This core industry is supported by a large number of 
component  suppliers, manufacturing services and logistics providers, distributors, 
retailers, service specialists and others.  These companies also support other segments of 
the electronics industry, and so are not counted as part of the PC industry, but as part of 
its overall production and innovation network.  This network not only supports 
innovation in the core industry segments, but also provides the necessary infrastructure 
for innovations in newer product categories such as ultramobile PCs, MP3 players (e.g., 
the iPod) and  smart phones. 
                                                
1 The research on which this paper is based has been supported by grants to the Personal Computing Industry 
Center of The Paul Merage School of Business at UC Irvine from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the U.S. 
National Science Foundation, the National Academy of Sciences and The California Institute for 
Telecommunications and Information Technology. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed in these materials are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of these sponsors. The authors acknowledge the very helpful comments of David Mowery, Jeffrey 
Macher and anonymous reviewers. . 
 
 Worldwide revenues for the core PC industry totaled $235 billion in 2005, 
including $191 billion in desktop and portable PCs, $28 billion in PC servers, and $16 
billion in smart handheld devices (IDC, 2006a).  In addition, PC software accounts for 
about half of the packaged software industry, whose 2006 sales were $225 billion, and 
PC use also drives sales of IT services and of other hardware such as storage, peripherals, 
and networking equipment (IDC, 2006c).   
 The PC has undergone considerable innovation and change since first introduced.  
The traditional PC is no longer expected to be the sole locus of innovation in the future, 
but simply one of many devices “orbiting the user” (The Economist, 2006).  
Communications devices (phones, PDAs) are gaining computing capabilities so people 
now send e-mail with a BlackBerry or download music on a mobile phone.  Digital 
photos can be transferred from a camera to a PC and uploaded to a website, transferred 
directly to a printer, or shot and e-mailed with a mobile phone.  While the traditional 
desktop and laptop PC is becoming less central to all computing activities, over 200 
millionPCs were sold in 2005 and the PC is often the first place for innovations to appear 
that may migrate later to other devices. 
 As important as product innovation has been, equally important is the steady price 
declines in recent years, which have brought PCs within the reach of more of the world’s 
population.  Emerging markets such as China and India are growing much faster than the 
more mature developed markets, and PC makers have begun to focus on innovation that 
addresses the needs of those markets at low prices.  Globalization of production has been 
credited for making computer hardware 10%-30% cheaper than it otherwise would be 
(Mann, 2003). The availability of ever cheaper, smaller and more powerful hardware has 
continued to expand the market and has stimulated ongoing innovation in hardware, 
software, and services. 
 While globalization has been a major factor in the PC industry’s growth and 
innovation, it raises issues for U.S. companies, government and other institutions, and 
workers.  U.S. PC makers are struggling to eke out a profit in an environment of falling 
prices and intense international competition.  Government policy issues include tax 
incentives, anti-trust, immigration and market access.  Universities must ensure that they 
are training people with the skills that industry needs, and workers must invest their own 
time and money to acquire those skills even as more highly skilled knowledge work is 
moved offshore. 
 The impacts of globalization have been debated extensively.. An optomistic view 
is that U.S. firms are outsourcing and offshoring lower end manufacturing and routine 
engineering work, freeing resources to focus on more dynamic innovation that will 
sustain profitability and create new jobs in the U.S.  A more pessimistic view is that 
innovation will follow manufacturing offshore, leaving U.S. firms uncompetitive and 
draining the U.S. of the innovation that drives growth and employment (Kotkin and 
Friedman, 2004).  
While macro-level data can be useful in analyzing these impacts of globalization, 
it can be easier to spot trends and impacts at the industry level, especially by looking at 
more dynamic industries where change is happening faster.  Personal computing is one 
such industry. Therefore, this chapter examines the globalization of innovation in the PC 
industry, its causes, its impacts, and its strategy and policy implications.  The focus is 
mainly on innovation-related activities in U.S. branded PC companies set in their global 
context. It is not an analysis of PC companies in other economies such as Japan, Taiwan 
or China although it brings them in as part of the global supply chain and the competitive 
context.  
The chapter is a fact-based analysis grounded in over 200 personal interviews 
with industry executives in the U.S. and Asia, data from the International Data 
Corporation (IDC), The Market Intelligence Center, Reed Electronics Research and 
Juliussen, published empirical research, and our study of the industry for over twenty 
years.    
We find that the global division of innovation-related activities can be 
characterized as follows: component-level R&D, concept design and product planning 
are performed in the United States and Japan; applied R&D and development of new 
platforms mostly take place in Taiwan; and product development for mature products and 
a majority of production and sustaining engineering are performed in China.  
 U.S. PC firms have benefited from this international division of labor, which has 
supported rapid innovation and quicker integration of new technologies into their 
products. The growing demand for smaller, more mobile products plays to U.S. firms’ 
strengths in product architecture and early-stage development.  Their bigger problem is 
earning profits from innovation in an industry dominated by Microsoft and Intel, who 
capture very high profit margins thanks to their control of key standards.   From the 
perspective of U.S. knowledge workers, the situation is more mixed.  The shift in 
production away from the United States has pulled many new product development jobs 
to Asia, while design and early-stage development work has remained largely in the 
United States.  Still, the new jobs created by the industry’s growth are largely outside of 
the U.S. Finally, from the consumer perspective, consumers in the U.S. have been clear 
beneficiaries of the very low cost structure that globalization has produced in PCs, as 
average selling prices have been reduced continually. 
 Following this Introduction, the structure of this chapter is as follows. Section II 
analyzes the nature of innovation and how production and innovation are organized 
across the value network.  Section III describes international trends in PC demand and 
production.  Section IV reviews the global structure of innovation in the PC industry and 
the factors driving globalization.  Section V considers the implications of the foregoing 
trends for firm strategy and U.S. national policy. 
II. Innovation in the Industry 
 The PC industry has introduced many innovations in its 25 year history.  Product 
innovation includes the creation of new product categories such as notebook PCs and 
PDAs, as well as the creation of new product platforms such as multimedia PCs and 
wireless “mobility” notebooks. The scope and outcome of product innovation in PCs is 
shaped by the presence of global architectural standards set originally by IBM and now 
largely controlled by Microsoft and Intel.  Common interface standards enable innovators 
to reach a global market with standard product lines; thus economies of scale can be 
achieved to support investments in product development and manufacturing capacity.  
This is different from industries such as mobile phones or video games, in which multiple 
incompatible standards exist.  An example of the benefits of standardization is the 
acceptance of 802.11 as a common standard which spurred the introduction of wireless 
networking as a standard feature on notebook PCs.  On the other hand, standardization 
battles can constrain innovation as PC makers are reluctant to incorporate technologies 
before a standard is set, as is the case with second generation DVD technology. 
 When PC makers do innovate, they face hard choices in trying to capture profits 
from their innovations.  One alternative is to incorporate the innovation only in their own 
products to differentiate their PCs from those of competitors, but there is a question of 
whether they can convince customers to pay for the differentiation and also whether 
customers will want to adopt a non-standard technology.  Another is to license the 
technology broadly, which might bring in license fees and even establish the technology 
as an industry standard, but will eliminate product differentiation.  One current example 
is HP’s Personal Media Drive (PMD), a portable hard drive that slides into a special slot 
in HP Media Center PCs.  HP incorporated the special slot into some of its own products, 
while letting customers connect the PMD to competitors’ PCs using a slower USB 
connection, thus differentiating HP’s PCs.  By contrast, HP has licensed its LightScribe 
technology for labeling DVDs and CDs to other PC makers.  In either case, it can be 
difficult to translate innovation into profits sufficient to justify the R&D effort.   
 Despite these challenges, which may discourage radical innovation, PC makers 
are pushed to incremental innovation by component makers who introduce frequent 
changes in their products (faster speed, greater capacity, smaller form factor, longer life) 
in efforts to gain greater market share within their industry sector such as 
semiconductors, storage or power supply.  PC makers feel they have to adopt these 
changes rather than risk being left behind by a competitor that does adopt.  One PC 
maker expressed the view that it would be better for everyone if the pace of innovation 
were slower, but no one is willing to take the risk of such a slowdown. Thus, competition 
and innovation in the supply chain tends to push PC makers into incremental changes that 
do little to differentiate products. 
 As a result, PC makers have tended to concentrate on operational efficiency, 
marketing, and distribution, rather than trying to use product differentiation as a source of 
sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 1996).  Product innovation at the system level 
tends to be incremental and emphasizes developing slightly different products for 
narrowly defined market niches, such as PC gamers who demand high performance or 
business travelers who desire ultra-light notebooks, rather than more distinctively 
innovative products.2  Instead, most product innovation occurs upstream in components 
and software, which are then incorporated by PC makers. 
 Consistent with the emphasis on efficiency and distribution, the industry has 
introduced business process innovations such as outsourcing, using the Internet as a 
direct sales channel, vendor managed inventory, third party logistics, and build-to-order 
(BTO) production.  At the plant level, some firms have replaced assembly lines with 
small production cells to facilitate BTO production, and adopted process improvements 
such as reducing the number of steps and improving quality in final assembly.  They also 
have employed a range of information technologies such as shop floor management 
systems, bar coding, and automated software downloads to improve manufacturing 
performance (Kraemer et al, 2000).  However, while early adoption of these innovations 
benefited some companies, particularly Dell Inc., competing PC makers have since 
adopted these and other process innovations and closed the gap on key measures such as 
inventory turnover and time-to-market for new products (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2005).  
Today, most companies use a mix of  build to forecast and build to order processes that is 
optimal for their targeted markets. The result is greater efficiency in the industry as a 
whole, but the benefit have not gone to the PC makers.  They have mostly gone to 
consumers in the form of lower prices, and to Microsoft and Intel, as software and 
microprocessors account for an ever greater share of the total cost of a PC.3 
 In order to understand innovation in the industry, it is important to look at the 
structure of the innovation network, the innovation processes, the key personal 
computing products and interdependencies between innovation processes, products, and 
the structure of the network. 
 
 
 
                                                
2 An exception is Apple, which emphasizes attractive design and close integration of hardware and 
proprietary software in its products.  While this has been very successful in its iPod line, Apple’s market 
share in PCs is under 4% worldwide, so it is unclear that its innovative PCs have done more than satisfy a 
small core of Mac users who are willing to pay a premium for its products.  By adopting Intel processors 
for all of its products, Apple has abandoned its proprietary hardware platform in favor of global economies 
of scale and greater compatibility with Windows PCs. 
3 Even these duopolists face challenges: Intel from AMD and Microsoft from Linux in one product 
category (servers). 
The Innovation Network 
 The PC industry’s innovation network consists of component makers, contract 
manufacturers (CMs) and Original Design Manufacturers (ODMs), branded PC firms, 
distributors and resellers (Figure 1).4   
 The industry can be characterized as horizontally specialized with the branded 
firms being “system integrators” doing design and outsourcing development and 
production to CMs or ODMs. There are about a dozen globally competitive PC makers 
and many small local assemblers, supported by another dozen major CMs and ODMs.  
There are several major suppliers of most key components, e.g. motherboards, hard 
drives, displays, optical drives, memory, batteries.  Further upstream in the supply chain, 
there are several thousand suppliers of parts and components, most of which are small 
and medium-sized firms; a few very large firms also exist in each category.  Distribution 
is mostly decentralized and local, although there are a few large distributors who operate 
internationally such as Ingram Micro, Tech Data and Arrow Electronics.  Our main focus 
in this chapter is on the branded PC vendors and ODMs who collaborate to bring new 
products to market using components from upstream suppliers. 
 Most R&D is done upstream in the industry--by the suppliers of microprocessors, 
software, peripherals and components.  This innovation is global in the sense that there 
are major component makers in the U.S. (microprocessors, graphics, memory, hard 
drives, networking, software), Japan (LCDs, memory, hard drives, batteries), Korea 
(LCDs, memory), and Taiwan (LCDs, memory, optical drives, power supply, various 
peripherals).  However, while some companies have set up R&D labs around the world, 
most R&D is still done in the home country.  Some PC makers also make components 
and peripherals, such as HP, Toshiba, Sony, and Samsung, but these are generally done in 
separate business units who sell to competing PC makers as well as their internal PC 
units. 
                                                
4 The terms contract manufacturer (CM) and original design manufacturer (ODM) are use 
commonly, but not always consistently in the electronics industry.  Contract 
manufacturers provide a range of manufacturing services, including subassembly, final 
assembly, logistics and even customer service.  Original design manufacturer is a term 
coined in Taiwan when its contract manufacturers began to offer product design and 
engineering as well as manufacturing of notebooks, motherboards and other products. 
 
 Figure 1.  The PC Industry Innovation Network 
 
 
Adapted from Curry and Kenney (1999). 
 The pace of this upstream innovation is a major factor shaping innovation by 
branded PC vendors who innovate through “systems integration.”  The PC vendors 
innovate by identifying new product markets and designing systems that incorporate new 
technologies to serve those markets. For instance, PC makers identified mobile PC users 
who want network access without having to plug in to a phone line or local area network.  
This capability was made possible when wireless networking technologies such as WiFi 
were introduced by component makers.  It was then up to PC makers to incorporate the 
technology into their products.  More importantly, they had to introduce a new 
technology at a time when the infrastructure to support wireless networking was nearly 
non-existent, hoping that this would create the impetus for firms and consumers to invest 
in wireless networks.  Apple initially jumped in by incorporating 802.11 wireless 
technology in all of its notebooks, and was soon followed by other PC makers.  Soon, 
wireless networks were available in offices, homes, schools, airports, and coffee shops 
around the world. Apple’s early decision was very risky, as there were few networks 
available, but by taking the risk helped to create the market for them. 
 Creation of new markets by PC makers in turn, can shape the direction of 
upstream innovation in components.  For wireless notebooks, PC vendors had to decide 
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which networking standard(s) to incorporate as well as find components with low power 
consumption, longer battery life, and light weight.  Available components seldom meet 
all these needs, so the lead PC vendors each developed their own product roadmaps 
which signal to the component suppliers where the firm is headed, the target markets and 
expected volumes, and the price/performance of components needed to succeed. Buy 
doing so, they provided advance knowledge to the upstream suppliers who could respond 
in terms of feasibility, aggregate demand across PC vendors, plan for the coming changes 
and  inform their own suppliers. These PC maker road maps, which are different from 
those provided by Intel to the PC makers, are essential to knowledge integration along the 
supply chain. 
Innovation Processes 
 Product innovation in the industry occurs through two broad processes--R&D and 
new product development.  R&D is an ongoing activity that generates new knowledge 
that can be applied to new products.  New product development is a multi-stage process 
of design, development and production that creates physical products for target markets.5  
Although conceptually distinct, there is often a close interaction between the two in 
practice.  New product development integrates knowledge developed by R&D, and R&D 
is often called on to solve a specific problem in product development.  Given that most 
R&D is done upstream by the component suppliers, the process of knowledge integration 
occurs between the supplier and PC maker.  The focus is on knowledge needed to 
integrate a standard component, but occasionally it involves customization or even more 
intensive joint development.  This is especially the case when an entirely new product is 
being created such as the wireless notebook that requires integration of communication 
technologies, or in the case of a new product category such as the Apple iPod. 
Products and Innovation Activities 
 Although new form factors are emerging, desktops and notebooks remain the 
leading products in the industry, with important differences between them that affect 
innovation activities.  For desktops, product innovation mainly centers on conventional 
systems integration--incorporating new parts, components, and software into a system 
                                                
5 A detailed discussion of these phases and the activities within each is provided in Dedrick and Kraemer 
(2006b). 
and ensuring that they work together.  The system is largely standardized with respect to 
components, parts, and interfaces according to standards set by Microsoft and Intel.  So, 
innovation involves the selection of components to be included for different target 
markets (e.g., home, office, game, “value” or “power” user).  Most use a standard full 
tower or mid-tower chassis with industrial design applied mainly to the bezel (face) to 
reflect a certain brand image.  A few newer models aimed at consumers’ living rooms 
have moved away from the “beige box” to smaller and more stylish designs with unique 
chassis and industrial designs.  PC vendors generally keep concept design and product 
planning in-house for close control over brand image, user interface, features, cost, and 
quality.  Outsourcing of physical development has occurred in a series of steps since the 
mid-1990s—first motherboard design, then mechanical design, system test, and finally 
software build and validation.  Intel facilitated this trend by providing support and 
reference designs to ODMs who develop motherboards and full systems. 
For notebooks, innovation involves high level system integration with complex 
mechanical, electrical, and software challenges.  Design of such a small form factor 
presents special challenges with heat dissipation, electromagnetic interference and power 
consumption, while the need for portability requires greater ruggedness.  Although 
components such as disk drives and flat panels are mostly standardized, notebooks 
involve many custom parts.  For example, in order to fit the modular components within 
the notebook chassis, the motherboard and battery pack may have to be customized for 
each notebook model.  The chassis and other mechanical parts require custom tooling. 
 PC vendors usually keep notebook design in-house, but coordinate physical 
development jointly with the ODM because there is a strong interdependency between 
the physical product development and manufacturing.  It is critical that product 
development take manufacturability into account from the beginning, otherwise a product 
may be developed that cannot be produced at the necessary volume, cost or quality.  Most 
notebook PCs are designed to be built in a particular assembly plant, with specific 
manufacturing process requirements.  As a result, product development and final 
assembly are almost always handled by one company.  In some cases, this means the PC 
maker keeps both in-house.  In most cases it means outsourcing both development and 
manufacturing of each model to a single ODM. 
 Thus, the interdependencies of PC form factors and New Product Development 
(NPD) activities have led to different organizational arrangements for desktops and 
notebooks (Figure 2).  Because desktops are less complex and more standardized, a 
complete product specification can be handed off for development and production to 
ODMs, or a fully developed product can be turned over to a CM for manufacturing.  
However, because of their greater complexity and customization, notebooks tend to be 
designed and developed jointly by the PC vendors and ODMs. 
Figure 2.  Organization of Innovation for Desktops and Notebooks 
 
 As a result of the interdependencies in notebook PC development, leading PC 
makers HP and Dell have set up design centers in Taiwan to work closely with ODMs, 
while others frequently send staff from the U.S.  The ODMs may divide product 
development and manufacturing between Taiwan and China, but with very close 
interaction between the two locations.  For desktops, it is easier to separate development 
and manufacturing geographically as well as across firm boundaries. 
 
III. Changing International Structure of Demand and Supply 
Trends in Demand 
 PC demand has been shifting steadily for over a decade towards smaller, more 
integrated and more communications-oriented products.  The global demand for PCs is 
changing in terms of form factor, commercial vs. consumer markets and regional 
consumption. Portable devices (laptops and notebooks) are the fastest growing form 
factor, totaling 32% of unit demand in 2005, compared to just 10% in 1990 (Figure 3), 
and expected to exceed desktops in the next five years (IDC, 2006b).  Other portable 
devices such as smart phones have seen rapid growth as well.  This means that there will 
be more demand for complex innovation in concept, design, and engineering in the future 
and that coordination among these stages will have to become much closer. 
Figure 3.  Global Demand for Desktops and Portables, 1990-2005 (units) 
 
Source: Juliussen, 2006. 
 Continued price/performance gains in key components as well as the shift of 
production to lower cost locations have driven prices lower, expanding overall demand 
for PCs.  One impact is in consumer markets whose share of the total market has 
increased from 28% to 38% between 1994-2005 (Figure 4). Another impact is in 
emerging markets where economic growth is providing the income to afford these ever 
cheaper PCs.  Although The Americas are still the biggest market in the world, followed 
by Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA), the Asia-Pacific region is the fastest 
growing market (Figure 5).  The U.S. is the single largest market with 61 million units 
shipped in 2005, but fast-growing China has surpassed Japan as the second biggest 
market. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Global PC Consumption by Commercial/Consumer Markets ( % of units 
sold) 
 
Source: IDC, 2006d 
Figure 5.  Global PC Consumption by Region, 1990-2005 ( % of units sold) 
 
Source: Juliussen, 2006. 
 Geographic Location of Production 
 With desktop PCs, final assembly by the branded vendors historically was located 
close to end user demand because of logistics (they are too heavy to ship affordably by 
air), and greater customization for national or regional markets.  Major PC vendors such 
as IBM, Compaq, HP, Apple, and Gateway initially had their own production facilities in 
each world region, but later outsourced production to CMs such as SCI, Flextronics, 
Solectron, Mitac, and Foxconn (the registered trade name of Hon Hai Precision Industry 
Co.) starting in the late 1990s.  Dell kept final assembly in-house, but outsourced base 
unit production, including chassis with cables, connectors, drive bays, fans, and power 
supplies.  Japanese and Asian vendors generally kept production in-house. 
 As the branded PC vendors moved offshore and then outsourced, there was a shift 
in the location of production from The Americas and EMEA to the Asia-Pacific region 
(Figure 6).  Initially, production was spread throughout East Asia in Japan, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea.  Production of desktop base units and various components 
and subassemblies by Taiwanese companies shifted to the Pearl River Delta in Southern 
China, but final assembly was usually done regionally: in the U.S. and Mexico for The 
Americas; Ireland and Scotland for EMEA and Malaysia; Taiwan and China for the Asia-
Pacific.6 
 Some U.S. companies outsourced notebook production to Japanese, Taiwanese, 
and Korean manufacturers, but eventually shifted mostly to Taiwanese ODMs.  In 2001, 
the Taiwanese government changed investment limitations for Taiwanese firms and the 
notebook industry moved en masse to the Yangtze River Delta near Shanghai.7 Japanese 
firms such as Toshiba moved their own notebook production to the region to take 
advantage of the supply base, but also outsourced much of their production as well. 
                                                
6 These locations are now changing once again.  For example, Dell is moving final assembly and suppliers 
to Poland for EMEA; both Dell and HP are encouraging their CMs to move to India for the Asia region; 
Dell is setting up final assembly in India. 
7 Some notebook ODMs and suppliers moved to the area as early as 1998 so there was already a supply 
base when most of the industry moved. For example, Asustek had 300 employees in China in 1999 and 
45,000 by 2005 (Einhorn, 2005). 
Chinese firms such as Lenovo used these same supply bases for their own production and 
outsourced some as well.8 
Figure 6.  Computer Hardware Production by Region, 1985-2004 
 
Source: Reed Electronics Research (2005). 2004 data is a forecast. Includes parts and subassemblies such 
as base units that are specifically produced for use in computer equipment. 
 
 By 2005 China was the single largest producer of PCs and computer equipment 
overall in the world.  Although the production facilities were located in China, they were 
mostly owned and managed by Taiwanese firms, such as HonHai/Foxconn and Mitac for 
desktops, and Quanta, Compal, Wistron and Inventec for notebooks.9  The supply chain 
was also composed largely of Taiwanese firms. Foxconn has a huge facility in Shenzhen 
that employs over 100,000 workers and produces base units and/or complete systems for 
nearly every branded PC vendor, while also assembling products such as game consoles 
and iPods, and making components such as cables, connectors, chassis and motherboards.  
Taiwanese ODMs produced 85% of all notebooks in the world in 2005 (Table 1), mostly 
in the Shanghai/Suzhou region of China. 
                                                
8 This was the case with the IBM PC Company and Lenovo both before and after their integration. 
9 After IBM sold its PC Division to Lenovo, only Dell (among the U.S. PC companies) had its own final 
assembly plant in China.  Dell’s largest assembly site in Asia is still in Penang, Malaysia. 
 In the past the location of final assembly was driven by the need for in the U.S. 
and Europe, but now appears to be driven by growing demand in Asia as well as by the 
growing capability of firms to exploit lower costs for labor, land and facilities, the 
availability of cost-effective skilled labor, and government incentives in China.10  For 
instance, low cost sea shipment of standard (not build-to-order) desktop PCs from China 
to the U.S., supported by more sophisticated demand forecasting and planning tools, 
allows PC makers to build a three-week shipment time into the new product introduction 
cycle.  Notebooks can be economically shipped by air, so even BTO production can be 
centralized in Asia.  Also, with most of the supply chain in Asia, it can be cheaper to 
assemble there and minimize shipment time for components as the supply base is 
concentrated there. 
IV. Globalization of Innovation 
 The location of NPD activities by the branded PC firms is driven by the product 
and process interdependencies discussed in Section II, the capabilities and relative costs 
of different locations, and relational factors that tend to “pull” innovation outside the PC 
vendor and/or offshore.  The relative capabilities and costs of U.S. firms and those in 
other countries have resulted in a new global division of labor: higher value architectural 
design and business management, along with associated “dynamic”/analytical 
engineering work is done in the U.S., whereas the development and manufacturing of the 
physical product, along with the more routine, “transactional” product and process 
engineering is done in Taiwan and increasingly in China.  The result is that both 
component and system innovation is increasingly global, but U.S. firms continue to play 
leading roles in both. 
Capabilities and Cost 
 The design of desktops and notebooks involves understanding markets and 
customer demand, as well as technology trends, anticipating how customer demand and 
technology trends are converging, and coordinating mixed teams of marketing people and 
technologists.  It requires people with skills and experience in high level architectural 
                                                
10 Dell is the only U.S. PC maker who still assembles desktop PCs in the U.S.; most final assembly of 
notebooks is centralized in Malaysia. The subassemblies come from the Pearl River Valley (desktops) and 
the Yangtze River Delta (notebooks) in China. Dell also does final assembly in China and other major 
markets. 
design, with the associated dynamic engineering skills, industrial design, and 
business/product management.11  In terms of proximity, it is important to be located in 
leading markets where new technologies are developed and adopted first. 
Development for desktops or notebooks involves more routine, transactional product and 
process engineering. Therefore, it requires people with mechanical, electrical and 
software engineering skills and technical project management experience.  In addition, 
notebook development requires specialized skills in thermal, electromagnetic 
interference, shock and vibration, power management, materials, radio frequency, and 
software.  These require a combination of formal training and experience working in a 
particular engineering specialty, as well as working on the specific product type. 
 Such knowledge and skill levels vary significantly in different locations due to at 
least three factors.  These are: (1) historical industrial development leading to creation of 
specialized skills, (2) output of educational systems, (3) nature of demand, including 
market scale and the extent to which the local or regional market may be described as 
cutting edge, with demanding and innovative customers. 
 In the U.S., there are business skills such as market intelligence and product 
management that are hard to find elsewhere.  There are also leading industrial design 
firms that specialize in small electronic products such as notebooks and cell phones, and 
strong software and high-level engineering skills. These skills are taught in universities, 
invested in by leading domestic firms in the industry, and honed through proximity to 
leading edge users. 
In Japan, there are industrial designers that are very good at designing for the Japanese 
market, but also have experience designing for global markets.  Japanese engineering 
teams have deep skills in design and development, with specialties such as 
miniaturization that have developed to meet Japanese demand for small, lightweight 
products.  Japan also is very strong in process engineering and manufacturing operations, 
thanks to its historical and continued emphasis on manufacturing. 
                                                
11 Gereffi and Wadhwa (2006) distinguish between dynamic and transactional engineers, a classification 
that we find useful in characterizing the engineering work forces in different countries based on our 
interviews.  Dynamic engineers are capable of abstract thinking and high-level problem solving using 
scientific knowledge, able to work in teams and work across international borders.  These engineers have at 
least four-year degrees in engineering and are leaders in innovation.  Transactional engineers have 
engineering fundamentals but not the skill to apply this knowledge to larger problems.  They usually have 
less than four year degrees and are responsible for rote engineering tasks. 
 In Taiwan, mechanical and electrical engineers are available with strong practical  
experience as well as theoretical knowledge.  Taiwan’s historical specialization in the PC 
industry and with notebooks, in particular, has created a pool of engineers with a great 
depth of knowledge in these products.  Taiwan also has strong process and manufacturing 
skills.  These have developed over time as Taiwanese firms have taken on greater 
responsibilities in PC development and manufacturing. Taiwan mostly lacks marketing 
skills and industrial design skills that would allow it to take over the concept and product 
planning stages, because of its focus on OEM/ODM production rather than development 
of branded products. 
 China has many well-trained mechanical and electrical engineers, but most lack 
the hands-on skills that come with experience.  Industrial design is weak and marketing 
and business skills are very underdeveloped.  A large number of engineers are produced 
each year, but quality varies greatly by university.  According to one interviewee, China’s 
engineers “work perfectly at doing what they have been told, but cannot think about what 
needs to be done; they lack both creativity and motivation.  They are good at legacy 
systems, but not new things; they can’t handle ‘what if’ situations.” 
 In comparing cost across countries, the average salary for electronics engineers in 
all industries in the U.S. is about $80,000, compared to $60,000 in Japan, $20,000 in 
Taiwan, and under $10,000 in China (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006b).  Obviously there are 
cost advantages to moving engineering to China, but differences in productivity related to 
education and experience can negate the direct cost differences.  Also, it is reported that 
engineering salaries are rising quickly in China, especially in industry clusters such as the 
Shanghai/Suzhou area, as multinationals and Taiwanese firms compete with domestic 
companies for talent.  The willingness of multinationals to pay higher salaries gives them 
access to more experienced engineers and graduates of top universities, but turnover rates 
are high. 
 Based on a survey of Taiwanese PC and electronics firms, Lu and Liu (2004) 
found that the main reason these companies were moving R&D (primarily development) 
to China was the availability of well-educated and cost effective local engineers.  This 
finding is supported by our own interviews with Taiwanese companies.  As Taiwan’s 
supply of engineers has failed to keep up with demand, the attraction of a large pool of 
engineers with both linguistic and geographical proximity has been strong.  This has 
enabled Taiwanese engineers to concentrate on more advanced development activities 
while lower-value activities such as board layout and software testing have moved to 
China. 
The New Global Division of Labor 
 This confluence of product and process interdependencies with changing 
capabilities and costs in different locations has led to a new global division of labor 
(Figure 7).  In 1990, the entire NPD process was located in the U.S. (and Japan) in large 
vertically integrated companies like IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Digital Equipment 
Corporation and Toshiba, or PC specialists like Apple, Compaq and Dell, which handled 
virtually all elements of system-level design and integration.  By 2000, only design 
remained in the U.S. while development and manufacturing of notebooks was outsourced 
mainly to Taiwan and manufacturing of desktops outsourced to major world regions.  
Japanese PC firms still kept NPD in-house, at least for higher value products. 
In 2006, the U.S. position was unchanged.  However, PC vendors like HP and Dell had 
set up design centers in Taiwan to manage NPD for some products (usually more mature 
product lines).  Locating design in Taiwan allows closer coordination with CMs and 
ODMs, potentially speeding up NPD and allowing better quality control and problem 
resolution.  They also use these design centers to transfer knowledge to the ODMs and to 
train locally hired hardware and software engineers to take on more project management 
and software development activities. This division of labor is similar for notebooks and 
desktops, although some U.S. companies keep desktop development in the U.S. and then 
outsource manufacturing to Asia. However, desktop development (which is much more 
limited, given the standardization of components and subassemblies) is being shifted to 
Taiwanese ODMs in many cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure7.  New Global Division of Labor in PC Industry 
 
 The next critical development was the rapid shift of production to mainland 
China. Encouraged by U.S. PC vendors, Taiwanese manufacturers had moved production 
of desktops and many components and subassemblies to the Pearl River Delta near Hong 
Kong in the 1990s.  Even more dramatic was the shift of notebook production to the 
Shanghai/Suzhou area after 2000.  Many Taiwanese suppliers to the notebook industry 
had moved to China before 2001.  When the Taiwanese government lifted its restrictions 
on notebook production in China, the ODMs and the rest of their local suppliers moved 
nearly all of their production to the mainland (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006a). 
 In response to U.S. PC makers outsourcing production to Taiwanese ODMs in 
China, the Japanese PC makers also shifted significant production to China, both through 
their own subsidiaries and through outsourcing to the Taiwanese ODMs.  This further 
illustrates the compelling economics of the production bases in China as Japanese firms 
have previously tended to keep production in-house, either in Japan or Southeast Asia. 
China’s Expanding Role as a Locus of Innovation 
 As a result of “production pull” as well as the large pool of lower cost engineering 
skills, there is an ongoing shift of product development activities from Taiwan to China.  
During our interviews with notebook makers in Taiwan and China, one major ODM told 
us that they did all of their board layout and most packaging design in China, while doing 
mechanical engineering and software engineering in Taiwan.  They were in the process of 
training people in their electronic engineering methods in China in order to move more 
development there.  As one manager said, “China is a gold mine of human resources, but 
if you don’t get in and train them you won’t be able to take advantage of it.” 
 It is expected that more of the NPD process and the associated engineering tests 
will be conducted in China by many notebook makers (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006a).  
These will be relocated from Taiwan, and in some cases, Japan.  The shift of product 
development to China is not only distinguished by which activities have moved or are 
moving, but also by the type of products that are being developed.  Some ODMs are 
moving product updates to China.  However, development of completely new products 
and platforms is still done by the ODMs in Taiwan, or by PC makers such as Lenovo (for 
Thinkpad notebooks) and Toshiba in Japan.  More recent interviews with Taiwanese 
companies suggest that they are hesitant to move these activities to China.  This is due in 
part to the high turnover rate of engineers in China, which make it hard to develop 
cohesive development teams and also raises the risk of intellectual property loss.  Also, 
unless intellectual property protections are strengthened, China is not likely to become a 
center for advanced component-level R&D, e.g., in microprocessors, LCDs, or wireless 
technologies. 
 A near term division of labor for product development is likely to be as follows: 
component-level R&D, concept design, and product planning in the U.S. and Japan; 
applied R&D and development of new platforms in Taiwan; product development for 
mature products, and nearly all production and sustaining engineering12 in China.  It is 
difficult to estimate how long this division of labor will last.  A recent study of 
                                                
12 Sustaining engineering is the second of two phases in production:  mass production and sustaining 
engineering. Mass production involves the physical manufacturing of a product in large volumes.  It 
requires manufacturing engineers to manage and plan the production process and test facilities and quality 
engineers to continually improve product and process quality.  Over time, these engineers come to know 
the product extremely well and are best positioned to provide sustaining engineering support that was 
previously provided by the original product development teams.  Sustaining engineering deals with 
changes that occur because of new chips, failing or end-of-life components or improved components. Each 
change must be evaluated in terms of its implications for system performance and assembly, and 
incorporated into the production process.  The sustaining engineers also provide the highest level of 
technical support when problems occur during use during a product’s 2-3 year warranty period. 
Taiwanese manufacturers (Li, 2006) shows that the rapid growth of low margin 
outsourcing business from foreign MNCs has provided Taiwanese firms with the 
resources and motivation to invest more in R&D in order to develop greater technology 
expertise and capture more high value design work.  As the ODMs’ expertise grows, 
MNCs have greater incentive to outsource more design activities to further lower costs.  
Li also shows that Taiwanese firms are attempting to capture value from their innovation 
efforts by filing for more patents.  So the shift from Taiwan to China may be slowing but 
the shift from the U.S. to Taiwan could continue.  This is exemplified by the rapid growth 
of Taiwan design centers owned by HP and Dell. 
 In addition, Taiwanese manufacturers such as Acer, Asus, BenQ, D-Link and 
Lite-on have developed their own brand name PCs, motherboards, monitors, networking 
equipment, smart phones and other products.  Acer and Asus brands have captured 14.1% 
of the world market for notebooks (Digitimes, 2006), while D-Link has become the top 
seller of wireless routers for the consumer market.  As these companies enhance their 
R&D, design and marketing capabilities, U.S. companies may find Taiwan to be a source 
of competition as well as cooperation. 
As China gains experience, it is still possible that the ODMs will shift more of the 
development process and newer products there, but unless it becomes a key final market 
for PCs, it is not likely to capture the market-driven functions of concept design and 
product planning.  As of now, China’s PC market is still only about one-third the size of 
the U.S. market, and does not have leading edge users who are defining what features and 
standards are developed for the global market.  However, as China’s PC market continues 
to grow, and its users become more demanding, it may become the leading market at 
least for the Asia-Pacific region, and definition and planning of products suitable for the 
region may be done there. Finally, while Chinese brands mostly remain minor players in 
the global PC industry for the most part, this may change.  Chinese companies such as 
Lenovo, Huawei, and Haier are already leading brands at home and are expanding to 
international markets for PCs, network equipment, and other electronics products.  
Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC business has put it directly in competition with HP and 
Dell around the world, while Huawei uses its relationship with 3Com to access 
technology and markets and compete with Cisco and others.  These companies can use 
the supply base of Taiwanese and foreign companies in China to match the multinationals 
on cost, develop products that fit the local marekt and then target other emerging markets 
where innovations developed for the Chinese market are likely to be attractive. 
 Measurement of the Globalization of Innovation 
 Measuring the globalization of innovation is more difficult than measuring 
globalization of manufacturing, which can be captured in national production, trade, and 
foreign investment accounts.  Innovation might be indirectly measured by R&D spending 
and employees, patents and new product introductions.  While some public data on these 
measures is available, often it is not sufficiently disaggregated at the firm level so that it 
can be tied to a product line such as PCs.  This is especially true of multidivisional firms 
such as HP, Fujitsu, Toshiba, Hitachi, Samsung and Sony.  Also, firm-level data does not 
show the extent to which R&D or other innovative activity is carried out in the home 
country or other locations. 
 Given these difficulties, an alternative approach is to measure the innovation 
effort by the CMs and ODMs who are doing much of the manufacturing in the industry.  
The share of global notebook shipments produced by Taiwanese ODMs rose from 40% in 
1998 to 85% in 2005 (Table 1).   
Table 1.  Taiwanese Notebook Industry Share of Global Shipments, 1998-2005 
  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Shipments volume 
(thousands) a 6,088 9,703 12,708 14,161 18,380 25,238 33,340 50,500 
Global market by 
volume (thousands) 15,610 19,816 24,437 25,747 30,033 37,857 46,110 59,411 
Taiwan’s share of 
global market volume 40% 49% 52% 55% 61% 66% 72% 85% 
Sources:   For 1998-2004, MIC (2005).  For 2005, Digitimes (2006). 
Notes: a Shipments by Taiwan-based firms, regardless of location of production 
 
Since manufacturing and development are usually outsourced together, this 
suggests that the share of offshore product development activity has increased 
proportionately.  This trend is supported by data showing that R&D spending by 
Taiwanese ODMs and CMs has increased significantly from 2000 to 2005 (Table 2), as 
has the proportion of employees with PhD and masters degrees in these firms.  However, 
most of this R&D spending is on the development side rather than the research side. 
Table 2.  R&D investment by Taiwanese ODMs and CMs (U.S. million dollars) 
Company Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Quanta 27.13 38.36 54.55 74.31 92.56 102.36 
Compal 24.77  44.69 62.11 70.21 78.78 
Wistron   61.12 55.06 68.94 72.49 
Asustek Computer 31.97 40.57 53.14 65.87 97.38 128.57 
Mitac 24.37 24.70 25.28 32.66 36.90 46.62 
Inventec 30.75 25.14 27.38 39.42  48.56 
Arima 13.42 12.74 14.85 15.00 19.60 16.71 
ECS 3.58 7.20 21.03 14.98 12.74 11.00 
First International Computer 
(FIC) 28.21 10.91 46.72 44.58   
Clevo 8.71 8.10 8.97 9.28 10.28 10.05 
Twinhead 7.24 5.31 1.10 0.31 0.43 0.47 
Uniwill 7.27 8.20 9.89 11.15 11.55 12.48 
Foxconn (HonHai) 32.43 58.14 64.45 66.69 128.78 132.86 
Subtotals 239.85 239.37 433.17 491.42 549.37 660.95 
Source: Annual reports of the companies. 
Note: Blank cells occur where data was not available in annual reports or elsewhere. 
  
Also, reiterating a point made earlier that most innovation is done by upstream 
component makers, the R&D spending by the ODMs and CMs, as well as nearly all of 
the PC makers, is minor in comparison to that of upstream suppliers.  For example, Table 
3 shows that in 2005 some of the lead PC makers13 spent 1.4% of revenues on R&D on 
average (weighted), the leading ODMs and CMs spent 1.3%, and the upstream suppliers, 
                                                
13 We could not get public estimates of R&D investment for the PC divisions of large multidivisional 
companies such as HP, Fujitsu, Toshiba, Sony and NEC so they are excluded from the table. 
which is where innovation occurs in the PC industry, spent 11.8% on average or nearly 
nine times greater than the PC makers, ODMs and CMs. 
 
Table 3.  R&D Investment as Percent of Firm Revenues, 2005 
PC Makers Taiwan ODMs & CMs Component suppliers 
 
R&D as % 
of Revenue  
R&D as % 
of Revenue  
R&D as % 
of Revenue 
Dell 0.9 Quanta 1.1 Microsoft 15.5 
Apple 3.8 Compal 1.4 Intel 13.3 
Gateway n.a. Wistron 1.6 AMD 19.6 
Lenovo 1.7 Asustek 1.7 ATI Technology 14.7 
Acer 0.1 Mitac 2.0 Seagate (HDD) 8.5 
  Inventec 1.4 Western Digital (HDD) 6.6 
  Arima* 2.8 Maxtor (HDD) 7.5 
  ECS* 1.6 Chunghwa (Displays) 3.4 
  FIC* n.a. Tatung (Displays) 2.6 
  Clevo* 4.2 AU Optronics (Displays) 2.2 
  Twinhead* 0.2 Molex (Cables/connectors) 5.2 
  Uniwill* 1.6 Delta (Power supply) 4.8 
  HonHai 1.0 Creative (Sound cards) 6.7 
Total firm revenues 
(millions) 
 
$92,535 
  
$76,191 
  
$128,773 
 
R&D (% of revenues) 
for selected firms 
(weighted) 1.4  1.3  11.8 
 
Source: Electronic Business Top 300 (2006), unless otherwise indicated.  *Value calculated from data in 
company annual reports. 
Note: Large multidivisional PC makers like HP, Toshiba, Sony, Fujitsu, NEC are omitted because R&D 
investment is not available by division. 
 
 
Industry Level Drivers of Globalization of Innovation 
 The globalization of innovation in the PC industry has been driven primarily by 
economic factors and secondarily by relational factors that involve interdependencies of 
activities, as well as social networks that often influence the choice of suppliers or 
location.  Examples of relational factors include the close interdependence between 
development and manufacturing of notebook PCs, and the “guanxi” social networks that 
link Taiwanese firms and managers. 
Regarding economic factors, the manufacturing of desktops was primarily pushed 
offshore to major world regions to reduce production cost, and secondarily for proximity 
to markets.  Manufacturing was then outsourced to CMs as most PC makers looked to 
further cut costs and concentrate on product design, branding, sales and marketing.  
These CMs are currently moving to new locations within each region (Eastern Europe for 
EMEA, Mexico for North America, and China for Asia-Pacific)—once again to reduce 
costs.  As noted above, for standard build-to-stock desktops, production is increasingly 
done in China for the U.S. market, as low cost shipping by sea is viable when fast order 
turnaround is not necessary. 
 Cost was also the key factor for notebooks, where both development and 
manufacturing were outsourced or offshored almost from the beginning—first to Japan, 
then to Taiwan, and currently to China.  Japan’s capabilities with development and 
manufacturing of small form factors provided an initial pull, but lower costs, 
development of strong indigenous engineering capabilities and the fact that Taiwanese 
firms were considered less likely to compete directly with U.S. firms resulted in U.S. PC 
vendors shifting to Taiwan.  In turn, Taiwan has moved manufacturing to China for lower 
cost labor, and manufacturing is now pulling some development activities to China as 
well.  Taiwan is trying to expand its role in R&D, design, and other high value activities, 
and PC vendors have facilitated this through continued outsourcing and by setting up 
design centers in Taiwan. 
Regarding relational factors in the PC industry, it appears that once production moves to 
a low cost location, it will pull higher level activities to it.  Reinforcing our findings about 
production pulling knowledge work, Lu and Liu (2004) found that the second major 
location factor for R&D (after access to low cost engineers) is proximity to the 
manufacturing site.  This is particularly true for notebook PCs given the importance of 
design-for-manufacturability.  For example, production engineering and sustaining 
engineering clearly benefit from proximity to manufacturing, as production problems can 
be addressed immediately on the factory floor and engineering changes in existing 
products can be tested in production models from the assembly line.  It also makes sense 
to move pilot production to China rather than maintain an assembly line in Taiwan just 
for this purpose.  Then the question arises whether to move the expensive test equipment 
from Taiwan to China.  If so, then there is more reason to relocate the design review and 
prototype processes as well. 
 Beyond proximity considerations in manufacturing, there is a relational “pull” 
from the ODMs.  They often bundle development with manufacturing in order to win 
contracts.  But once the ODM has a contract, the relationship creates incentives for the 
PC maker to work with the same ODM for future upgrades and enhancements to the 
product.  In addition, there is a great deal of tacit knowledge created in the development 
process that is known only by the ODM, which creates a further pull.  Finally, the close 
linkage of development activities to manufacturing and the feedback to design from 
manufacturing has created linkages favoring continuing the ODM relationships. 
The concentration of product development and manufacturing in Taiwan and China has 
reduced cost and accelerated new product innovation, driving down average unit prices 
(AUP), and helping to expand markets.  For example, the worldwide average unit price 
for a PC and monitor has declined markedly over the last fifteen years (Figure 8), with 
desktops and notebooks selling at an average of under $1,100 and $1,400, respectively in 
the U.S. in 2005, and many models available for well under $1,000.  Of course when 
adjusted for quality improvements, the price decline is much more dramatic.  Moreover, 
the price differences between the U.S. and other regions has declined so that there is now 
effectively one world price. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Average Unit Price, Desktops and Notebooks, 1990-2005 
 
Source: Juliussen, 2006. 
 
 Beyond cost reduction, the globalization of innovation also has been driven by a 
desire to develop a better understanding of the needs of big emerging markets such as 
China, India and Brazil to enable the right versioning of existing products.  Some PC 
vendors and ODMs (as well as other suppliers like AMD, Intel and Microsoft) are 
seeking new markets in less developed economies by developing new PCs with much 
lower price points while also tailoring the technologies to the more extreme environments 
of these countries.  These new product concepts include the One-Laptop-Per-Child 
design, Intel’s Classmate PC, and Asus’s eeePC.   While previous efforts to develop very 
low cost PCs for developing countries have failed, PC makers and others continue to 
experiment with new designs. 
 
V. Implications of Globalization of Innovation 
 The globalization of innovation has led to a new global division of labor, with 
higher value architectural design and business management, along with associated 
dynamic engineering work done in the U.S. and Japan, whereas much of the development 
and manufacturing of the physical product, along with related product and process 
engineering is done in Taiwan and increasingly in China.  This new international 
structure of the PC industry has implications for firm competitiveness and strategy, 
location of innovation, employment, and U.S. policy. 
Implications for U.S. Firm Competitiveness 
 Overall, the changes in the industry appear not to have hurt the competitiveness of 
U.S. firms.  U.S. companies dominate key components such as microprocessors, graphics 
and other chips, they are leaders in hard drives, and PC vendors Dell, HP and Apple hold 
nearly 40% of the world market for PCs.  U.S. firms are still unquestioned leaders in 
operating systems and packaged applications.  On the other hand, Asian firms are leaders 
in displays, memory, power supplies, batteries, motherboards, optical drives and other 
components and peripherals.  Asia has some leading PC brands such as Lenovo, Toshiba, 
Acer 14and Sony, and Taiwan’s CMs and ODMs increasingly compete with U.S. contract 
manufacturers for outsourced development and manufacturing.  On another measure of 
firm competitiveness, the largest share of industry profits flow to U.S. companies, 
particularly Microsoft and Intel, but also to Apple, Dell, HP, and to component makers 
such as Nvidia, TI, and Broadcom.  The profitability of most Japanese and Asian 
companies is generally lower. 
Implications for Firm Strategy 
 For branded PC vendors, the international innovation network described above 
enables faster product cycles with quicker integration of new technologies because the 
Taiwanese companies are good at fast turnaround and there is a good supply of cost-
effective engineers in Taiwan and China to handle more models, changes, and upgrades.  
It has increased consumer choice, helped grow the market, and for a long time was 
advantageous for Dell because its direct model gave it an advantage in getting those 
products to the business customer.  But now that most firms are efficient in minimizing 
inventory and getting new products into the market, the fast product cycles could be seen 
as an expensive race to the bottom that no PC vendor or component supplier really wins 
(except Intel and Microsoft).15  Some PC vendors complain that component innovation is 
                                                
14 Acer, which has been a successful Taiwanese branded company, purchased Gateway Computer and 
Packard Bell in October 2007.. 
15 As desktop PCs in particular have become commoditized, business model innovations such as direct 
sales, build-to-order and just in time inventory have provided temporary advantage in the industry.  They 
too fast, and they feel pressured to introduce too many products for too small markets.  
For example, one major PC vendor introduces around 1,000 different consumer desktop 
SKUs (stock keeping units) in one year globally (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006b).  A 
question raised by more than one company that we have interviewed is whether the cost 
of managing so many products might outweigh the benefits of being able to offer 
products that more closely match the needs of customers. 
 Beyond desktop and notebook PCs, the growing demand for new products that are 
smaller, more mobile, and integrate new functions is bringing new innovation and new 
players into the personal computing industry.  Hit products such as RIM’s Blackberry and 
Palm’s Treo have been developed by firms with no traditional PC business, while 
Apple’s iPod was developed on an entirely different platform from the Macintosh 
computer line.  Such radical, or architectural product innovation (Utterback, 1990; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990) has important differences from the incremental model of 
development as illustrated in Table 4.  The scale and scope of global collaboration is 
often greater for radical innovation, as existing technologies are adapted to new uses and 
new technologies are developed.  As a result, there is greater need for joint development 
with partners, while key technologies (particularly software) are developed internally and 
the entire process is shaped by strong central vision, integration, and control. 
An example of the nature of radical innovation is the iPod, which was developed 
by Apple in collaboration with many external partners in multiple geographic locations.  
Apple used its internal capabilities to create a closely integrated hardware and software 
design, while relying on outside partners for both standard and custom components, and 
for manufacturing.  For instance, Apple used a reference design and worked jointly with 
PortalPlayer to develop the microchip that controlled the iPod’s basic functionality.  It 
worked with others for additional chips (e.g., UK’s Wolfson Microelectronics for the 
digital-to-analog sound chip; New York-based Linear Technology for power 
management chips; California-based Broadcom for a video decoder chip); with Toshiba 
                                                                                                                                            
provided an initial advantage to Dell and Gateway, who were the first to adopt direct sales, but Gateway 
stumbled badly and Dell’s efficiency advantage has been reduced as other PC vendors have gone to direct, 
BTO sales.  The Dell model also has proved less successful in overseas markets where direct sales are less 
popular than in the U.S. The most important impact of past business model innovation has been a general 
improvement in the efficiency of the industry as a whole, as most vendors have adopted these practices.  
 
for the 1.8 inch hard drive; and with Taiwan’s Inventec for manufacturing (Murtha, et al., 
forthcoming). 
Table 4.  Features of Incremental and Radical Innovation 
 Design Development Production 
Radical 
Innovation 
(iPod, iPhone, 
Treo) 
-Set system architecture, sometimes 
building on external reference design 
-Strong central vision & industrial 
design 
-Tightly control all aspects of NPD 
-Develop key software internally 
-Integrate hardware, software, even 
services (e.g., iTunes, iTMS) 
-Design or license complementary 
assets (SW, content) and distribution 
system 
-Collaborate closely with a few key 
partners for core components 
 
-Collaborate with many 
partners in multiple 
geographies. 
-Collaborate with partners 
of partners 
-Get partners to adapt 
existing technologies to 
proprietary architecture 
 
 
Outsourced to 
CM or ODM 
Incremental 
innovation 
(desktops, 
notebooks) 
-Innovate on Wintel architecture 
-Control product planning, brand 
image, marketing, concept design 
internally 
-Internal or outsourced industrial 
design 
-HW and SW are modular 
-Leverage existing complementary 
resources and distribution 
-Collaborate with one 
established ODM in one 
geography 
-Outsource detailed physical 
design, test and software 
built within standard 
architecture 
Outsourced to 
ODM 
 
 Apple designed the system architecture that affected critical features such as 
sound quality and power consumption and developed the distinctive industrial design of 
the iPod; it developed most of the iPod and iTunes software in-house or adapted others’ 
software.  Apple tightly managed the whole process, coordinating closely with outside 
partners so that it could design the iPod, and its manufacturer and suppliers could 
concurrently prepare the tooling and supply chain for large volume manufacturing, and 
bring it to market in eight months.  As put by the iPod’s lead engineer, “Today, there is 
too much complexity in products for one person or organization to understand.  You need 
a team of internal and external resources working with you to conceive, design, and 
implement new products” (Murtha et al., forthcoming).  The resulting design process is 
much different from that in PCs, with more internal development and much closer 
interaction with key component suppliers. 
Finally, for the iPod to be successful in the market, Apple created a new business 
model that integrated hardware, software, and online content delivery.  It developed 
iTunes software to collect and manage content on a PC or Mac and easily transfer that 
content to the iPod. It also developed the online iTunes Music Store and tightly integrated 
that with the iTunes application.  Apple licensed content from all the major music labels 
and subsequently from the audio book, movie and television industries, and established 
pricing and digital rights models that were attractive to consumers.  The result was a U.S. 
market share of over 70% in both the personal music player and music download 
markets. 
 Given that such design innovation has the potential for creating differentiation in 
products and gaining competitive advantage, the strategies of at least some branded PC 
firms are likely to focus more on creating new product platforms.  However, examples 
such as the iPod, Treo and Blackberry suggest that radical innovation requires a different 
process of new product development.  As illustrated by our earlier discussion of these 
innovations, elements of the process include leveraging a firm’s unique internal 
capabilities with those of external partners; working closely with external partners in 
multiple geographies; engaging in a global search for technologies that can be adapted 
and integrated into new products; maintaining tight architectural and managerial control 
over the process; and possibly introducing new business models to provide 
complementary content and services. 
 This kind of process is far removed from the incremental innovation within a 
well-established product architecture and mature market of the Wintel PC world.  As a 
result, it has been more diversified companies such as Samsung and Sony, wireless 
specialists such as Nokia, as well as many start-ups that are trying to innovate with new 
product platforms that mix communications, entertainment and computing capabilities in 
smaller form factors.  In these cases, firms have worked with outside partners to exploit 
external sources of knowledge, while keeping their own innovative activities mostly in-
house and close to their home base. 
 Increasingly, hardware-software integration is becoming important as a means of 
tailoring products to different market requirements such as communications standards, 
power consumption, language, and customer tastes.  Such integration also helps to reduce 
product costs by enabling standard physical platforms to be produced in large volumes 
for global sales.  More importantly, it enables greater product differentiation for ever 
finer market segments by customizing through changes in software, rather than through 
costly physical changes in hardware. 
Location of Innovation 
 Innovation at the national level is closely tied to the presence of both technically 
skilled and entrepreneurial individuals, the quality of infrastructure, and the presence of 
advanced users who drive firms to innovate.  Rapid diffusion of Internet infrastructure in 
the U.S. led to ongoing innovation in hardware (e.g., routers, switches), software (e.g., 
browsers, search engines), and services (e.g. online retailing, banking, stock trading, 
travel services).  The U.S. has seen strong user-driven innovation (Von Hippel, 1998) 
such as IT-enabled business process redesign and e-commerce in the corporate world and 
user-created content in the consumer world.  From Cisco and Amazon, to Dell and 
WalMart to Google and MySpace, innovation on the web has largely occurred in the U.S. 
 By contrast, the relatively slow adoption of broadband and advanced mobile 
technologies in the U.S. has left the country falling behind in new areas of innovation.  
For instance, South Korea is a leader in online computer gaming, thanks in part to its 
widespread deployment of cheap broadband Internet service.  Japan’s iMode system for 
mobile Internet was years ahead of similar services in the U.S.  High rates of wireless 
adoption have benefited firms from South Korea, Japan and Northern Europe, while 
China’s large mobile phone market has attracted firms such as Motorola, Nokia, and 
Siemens to do product development there.  In short, the lack of innovation in industries 
that are providers of complementary assets (which in turn may reflect the outmoded 
infrastructure underpinning the large and otherwise highly sophisticated U.S. domestic 
market) is a major factor hampering innovation in the PC industry.  If the U.S. is to retain 
its position as a leading market for computing innovation, it cannot afford to remain 
behind in providing high quality, low cost infrastructure to support user-led innovation 
and drive demand for new personal computing products. 
 Our field interviews indicate that design innovation, especially concept design 
and product planning, is likely to remain centralized in the U.S. for the major U.S. firms 
in the personal computing industry.  However, there will be increasing use of offshore 
R&D and design centers in locations that have specialized and cost-effective talent, lead 
in particular technical innovations, or represent important markets in terms of growth 
potential, special market opportunities (fewer regulatory requirements, government 
incentives), or challenges (need for cheaper or environmentally friendly PCs), or that may 
influence technical standards (as China is trying to do in a number of technologies).  
Private interviews with industry executives indicate that the primary motivation for such 
offshore outposts is cost reduction, through hiring less costly engineers, programmers, 
and managers to perform activities previously performed in-house in the U.S. or in a 
foreign subsidiary.  In time, secondary benefits may also arise as these locations gain 
capabilities or local markets develop. 
 Other product development activities tend to be pulled by production, beginning 
with manufacturing process engineering and then moving up to prototyping and testing, 
and eventually electrical, mechanical and software engineering. These are in the process 
of shifting to China from Taiwan and Japan, although R&D, design, and development of 
newest generation products is still likely to be concentrated in the home countries of the 
manufacturers (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006a). 
Impacts on Jobs and Employment 
 With respect to U.S. workers, much of the potential shift of jobs offshore has 
already taken place with the offshoring and outsourcing of production from 1990-2005.  
There has also been a shift in innovation-related jobs after 2000, as production has pulled 
development and some design activities to Asia (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006a).  Further 
movement of jobs offshore is likely in the future in order to meet competitive pressure for 
continuous cost reduction.  The jobs will be in engineering, software, industrial design, 
engineering management, and project management at all levels.  As one PC industry 
executive told us in interviews, he has to “push” more physical design and project 
management jobs overseas in order to keep concept design jobs at home. 
 The number of jobs directly moved offshore is not large and occurs incrementally.  
However, another indicator of the impact of offshoring is the number of new jobs that are 
created offshore rather than in the U.S. to support the industry’s continued growth and 
proliferation of products.  One indicator of this impact is the growth of knowledge jobs in 
the notebook industry in Taiwan as these firms take on more design and development 
activities for the U.S. and other firms.  Interviews and company data on the top ODMs in 
the notebook industry indicate that they hired thousands of new R&D personnel and 
product engineers in Taiwan between 2000-2005, while also hiring thousands more for 
product and process engineering, testing, and production in China.  For example, Quanta, 
which is the largest notebook ODM, has increased the number of R&D engineers from 
750 in 2001 to around 7,000 in 2005 (company annual reports). 
 As software becomes an increasingly important part of new PC products, there 
will be a proportionately greater increase in software jobs being moved offshore.  In one 
company we interviewed, 50% of the 1,000 employees are engineers and 80% of these 
are software engineers.  These jobs are currently in the U.S., but the firm is 
experimenting with offshore teams.  While there is broad awareness of the shift of jobs to 
India and elsewhere by software and IT services companies, there is less awareness of the 
number of software jobs within the computer hardware industry—jobs that are likewise 
vulnerable to offshoring. 
For the U.S., the fact that growth and innovation in the industry is not creating new 
knowledge jobs (engineering, software, design) in the U.S. while creating them in Taiwan 
and China appears to be a negative.  But the number of U.S. engineering jobs in the 
broader computer industry is fairly stable at about 60,000 between 2002 and 2005 
(Dedrick and Kraemer 2006b), and without globalization there may not be as much 
growth and innovation.  The risks of globalization for the U.S. are that individuals, firms 
or related industries will lose technological advantage and ability to innovate.  A recent 
Korn/Ferry International report posed the issue for industry executives as follows: 
“North American industrial executives must choose between two fundamental 
responses to their current competitive environment. One approach is to simply 
accept that their companies need to focus exclusively on marketing, finance and 
the design and development functions, while offloading their manufacturing needs 
and technologies to more accommodating locations, usually overseas.  While this 
strategy can generate short-term profits, it almost inevitably guarantees that a 
company will lose control of its design and production capabilities. Eventually, if 
history is a reliable guide, even home office and corporate functions will cease to 
exist”. (Kotkin and Friedman, 2004) 
 However, earlier industry innovations as well as recent innovations like the iPod, 
the Treo and the Microsoft Xbox were developed mostly in the U.S., even though some 
component innovations came from offshore suppliers and all the manufacturing was done 
offshore.  Moreover, there is little evidence thus far that these firms have “lost control” of 
the designs or technology for these products.  Such innovation is less likely to move 
offshore and should continue to support engineering and other knowledge jobs in the 
U.S., as long as the U.S. retains the capabilities needed for such innovation. 
Implications for Policy: Sustaining U.S. Innovation Leadership 
 Although U.S. PC vendors still lead innovation in the industry, they are moving 
more innovation activities offshore both through setting up design centers and 
outsourcing design and development activities to ODMs.  The U.S. suppliers of key 
components such as microprocessors, storage, and software are also setting up R&D and 
design centers offshore, sometimes in locations with specialized skills such as Israel or 
Japan, and sometimes in big emerging markets with low cost engineering talent such as 
India and China. 
 The engineering, software development, and management skills associated with 
these activities are key to the innovation capabilities of the U.S. and therefore 
consideration needs to be given to developing people with these skills if such innovation 
is to remain in the U.S. (Committee on the Engineer of 2020, National Academy of 
Engineering, 2005).  Our interviews with executives indicate there is a growing need 
across the PC industry for engineers who are specifically trained to work at the interface 
between hardware engineering, communications, and computer science.  The executives 
also indicate that many U.S. engineering schools produce specialists in a single 
engineering discipline, but few schools produce people who can work at the interfaces of 
these disciplines.  There is a need, for example, for hardware engineers who can work 
with communications standards, and software engineers who can produce embedded 
software that enables customization of products for markets.  When universities fail to 
develop such talent, firms may rely on on-the-job training, look offshore for experienced 
people with the needed skills, or develop the skills offshore through on-the-job training of 
low cost specialists. 
 It is also likely that U.S. firms need to make greater efforts to hire rookies and 
develop them.  Several of the companies we interviewed prefer to hire fairly experienced 
engineers rather than beginners, and report no problems in doing so in Silicon Valley or 
elsewhere.  They simply hire people away from other companies, or bring in engineers 
from foreign countries under immigration policy.  However, one highly innovative 
company we interviewed hired engineers as interns from the best engineering schools in 
the U.S. (e.g., Cornell, MIT, UC Berkeley, Carnegie-Mellon) and if they worked out, 
made commitments to hire them even before they graduated.  Starting as interns, they 
worked as part of project teams with operational roles and real challenges to overcome.  
Such on-the-job training can help sustain a career ladder for new engineers as firms 
offshore more lower level jobs that would normally be filled by entry level engineers. An 
executive for the firm argued that this process benefits the firm as well, by giving it 
access to the best talent available and the chance to incorporate them into product 
development teams and learn how the company works before the engineers develop bad 
habits elsewhere. 
 From a policy perspective, the U.S. government can encourage cross-disciplinary 
education and more university-industry cooperation through its funding choices, and by 
documenting and publicizing the need for such changes.  While universities are 
responsive to employer needs, there can be significant inertia in academic departments 
and university bureaucracies, and external resources and pressure can encourage greater 
responsiveness and flexibility. 
 All of the firms we interviewed indicated a need for more H1B visas, and/or for 
reform of the visa process. One issue involves procedures for keeping people who have 
been educated in the U.S. and perhaps interned with the firm.  Another involves 
recruiting from abroad for skills where the U.S. supply of talent is limited, but other 
countries are noted for having people with the needed skills.  For example, it appears that 
the supply of engineers in analog fields such as radio frequency in the U.S. is limited, 
whereas there is a good supply in some European countries.  A reported problem with the 
current immigration process is that the nature of U.S. supply of talent is not considered. 
From an immigration standpoint, an engineer is an engineer regardless of education level 
(bachelor, master’s, PhD) and there is no way to identify and respond to shortages of very 
specific skills or levels (e.g., bachelor vs. PhD). 
 In addition to such human resource issues, another key concern is sustaining the 
demand for innovation.  PC demand, and associated innovation, has been driven in the 
past decade largely by the Internet and networking in general.  With the U.S. leading in 
Internet adoption, the PC industry was quick to adopt networking technologies such as 
Ethernet and wireless networking, and new products such as the Blackberry and Treo 
were developed in the U.S.  However, the U.S. has fallen behind a number of countries in 
both wireless and broadband adoption and is not the lead market for products and 
services such as mobile phones and online gaming.  As a result, innovations in new 
personal computing devices such as smart phones, video game consoles and other 
network devices are likely to target foreign markets initially, making it more likely that 
innovation will occur in those markets rather than the U.S. 
 While specific policy issues with regard to telecommunications, Internet 
regulation, content and pricing are beyond the scope of this paper, those decisions should 
be made with an awareness of their potential impact on U.S. innovation in industries such 
as personal computing.  Innovation in PCs can require cooperation by providers of 
complementary assets, such as content or communication infrastructure.  Government 
policies on telecommunications can influence the speed of diffusion of infrastructure like 
broadband, 3G or municipal WiFi networks.  Similarly, government policies on copyright 
can influence the terms under which content can be distributed.  While these policy issues 
are usually debated in terms of impacts on competition, intellectual property rights, or 
even consumer choice, policy makers also should consider their impact on innovation in 
high technology industries. 
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